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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the commencement of the 2012 National Football 
League (NFL) season, it became clear that a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the NFL and the NFL 
Referees Association (NFLRA) was far from being signed.  In 
the NFL, like other professional sports leagues, collective 
bargaining is often used to resolve labor disputes.  In 2011, 
the NFL and the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA) also struggled to come to terms on a 
collective bargaining agreement. Such negotiations create 
drama for fans and commentators alike as they nervously 
speculate as to whether there will be a strike or lockout and, 
if so, when to expect the sport to resume. In 2012, it became 
obvious that the referees would not reach an agreement in 
time, and the NFL hired replacement referees for the 
preseason.  Eventually, these replacement referees went on to 
call the first three weeks of regular season games. During 
these weeks, the replacements referees were berated by 
spectators, including NFL executives, for the calls that were 
missed, ignored, or made improperly. 
While fans complained fruitlessly, DeMaurice Smith, the 
NFLPA Executive Director, also recognized the larger issue 
that the replacement referees posed: player safety.1  Looking 
past inaccuracies that affected only teams’ records, Smith 
focused on the inadequacy of calls that left players vulnerable 
to injury.2 Smith threatened a league-wide player strike until 
the NFL and NFLRA reached a CBA.3  However, 
commentators noted that the threat seemed hollow due to the 
apparent inability of the players to strike under their own 
collective bargaining agreement.4 
The NFLPA and the NFL agreed to a CBA in 2011 that 
explicitly included a “No Strike” Provision.5  In this CBA, 
subject to a Union Security exception, any “strike, work 
 
 1.  Simon Samano, DeMaurice Smith doesn’t rule out strike over referee lockout, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/ 
post/2012/08/demaurice-smith-nfl-strike-replacement-refs/1#.UQQIVuivwh1. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Alicia Jessop, Take the Field: Why the NFLPA Cannot Strike Over Replacement 
Referees, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2012/08/29/ 
take-the-field-why-the-nflpa-cannot-strike-over-replacement-referees/.  
 5.  NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 3 §1, August 4, 2011. 
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stoppage, or other concerted action interfering with the 
operations of the NFL” is impermissible.6 Thus Smith’s threat 
of an immediate strike seemed to threaten a violation of the 
NFLPA’s collective bargaining agreement. 
However, § 143 of the National Labor Relations Act, added 
by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,7 designates 
a specific instance during which a work stoppage is not 
considered a strike.8 Under this section, an employee may 
refuse work, in good faith, if he perceives an abnormally 
dangerous condition exists in the work environment.9 
Assuming this law is applicable, the NFLPA would have had 
to establish that the replacement referees created an 
abnormally dangerous condition for the players in order for a 
strike to be permissible under their CBA. Ultimately, whether 
or not an abnormally dangerous condition exists turns on the 
interpretation of § 143 under existing precedent. If 
established, a strike would have been a permissible option for 
the players during the time the replacement referees were 
used. 
Part I of this Comment will offer a detailed analysis of the 
NFL’s response to injuries, such as rule changes to protect 
players. It will also explore the NFL’s broader response to 
injuries in the game. Using the League’s past behavior and 
the seriousness with which the League responds to injuries, 
this section will also analyze the replacement referees’ 
qualifications to officiate a professional game. Part II will 
consider the relevant rules of law regarding work stoppages. 
Finally, Part III will apply the facts in the NFLPA’s situation 
to the standards that have been developed regarding work 
stoppage in the presence of a “No Strike” provision. 
I.  NFL INJURY HISTORY 
In recent years, the NFL has taken seriously the potential 
for injury during games, specifically with regard to hits that 
have tendencies to produce concussions. As safety threats 
became more salient, the NFL frequently adopts rules to 
further player safety. As early as 1962 the NFL implemented 
 
 6.  Id. at Art. 3 §1, Art. 47 §1, §6. 
 7.  Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 162 (June 23, 1947) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §143 (2012)). 
 8.  29 U.S.C. §143 (2012). 
 9.  Id.  
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a rule prohibiting grabbing a player’s facemask.10  Over the 
next 15 years, the League sporadically implemented rules to 
accommodate safety, until player protection became a 
predominant interest of rule makers in 1979.11 This was 
further emphasized in 1980 with the implementation of the 
personal foul rule that prohibited “striking, swinging, or 
clubbing on the head, neck or face.”12 In 1996, player safety 
concerns ultimately led the NFL to designate helmet-to-
helmet contact as a personal foul.13 However, before the NFL’s 
interests changed and this rule was officially implemented, 
the League often “turned a blind eye” to the dangerous plays 
on the field.14 Meanwhile, coaches were encouraging this 
unsafe play.15  Collectively, these rule changes testify to the 
NFL’s intention to avoid injuries.  The NFL has even 
acknowledged that particular contact, specifically head-to-
head contact, does cause serious, preventable injury.16 
Superficial injuries such as broken bones or torn muscles, 
whether or not they are career ending, do not compare to the 
effects of multiple concussions. A concussion, though 
frequently regarded as a bruise to the brain from collision 
with a hard surface, can in fact occur without any collision at 
all and often will produce little to no swelling or bleeding in a 
radiological scan.17 A concussion is common when “the head 
 
 10.  History of the NFL Rules, SPORTSATTIC.COM, 
http://www.sportsattic.com/araig/NflRulesHistory.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
 11.  Id. (noting that in 1977, the rules implemented to lessen injuries included: 
outlawing the head slap, prohibiting offensive linemen from thrusting their hands at an 
opponent’s neck, face or head, prohibiting the clipping of wide receivers, and only 
permitting defenders to make contact with eligible receivers once.); see also Jennifer 
Ann Heiner, Concussions in the National Football League: Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle 
NFL Player Ret. Plan and a Legal Analysis of the NFL’s 2007 Concussion Management 
Guidelines, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 255, 271 (2008) (stating that “In 1979, 
the NFL adopted major changes to increase player safety. The rules prohibited players 
from blocking below the waist during kickoff and punt returns, and prevented the 
players from wearing damaged equipment that could be potentially hazardous. Officials 
were also to call a play dead when the quarterback was in the potentially dangerous 
grasp of a defensive tackler.”). 
 12.  SPORTSATTIC.COM,  note 10; Heiner, supra note 11 at 271. 
 13.  SPORTSATTIC.COM, supra note 10; Heiner, supra note 11 at 271. 
 14.  Jeremy P. Gove, Three and Out: The NFL’s Concussion Liability and How 
Players Can Tackle the Problem, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 649, 657 (2012).  
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Head Injuries in Football, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20121017050303/http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/tim
estopics/subjects/f/football/head_injuries/index.html (accessed by searching for the 
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either accelerates rapidly and then is stopped, or is spun 
rapidly.”18 Without direct collision, what the brain is actually 
being “stopped” by is the skull, and thus no helmet can truly 
protect a player.19  What does protect players are the rules 
implemented by the NFL to prevent concussions and the 
referees trained to enforce these rules. 
Additionally of concern is that, according to neurologists, 
after one concussion, individuals are up to four times more 
likely to suffer another—and with each successive concussion, 
the required force to sustain a future concussion decreases.20 
In a 2000 survey of former NFL players, data indicated that 
“60 percent had suffered at least one concussion in their 
careers and 26 percent had had three or more.”21  The 
individuals who had reported concussions also reported 
symptoms of memory, concentration, and neurological 
problems far more than those who had never suffered from a 
concussion.22 In 2009, another study revealed that symptoms 
of Alzheimer’s disease and other memory-related illnesses 
occur in the NFL’s former players “vastly more often” than in 
the general population.23  Furthermore, in 2007, a study found 
that retired NFL players who had sustained three or more 
concussions during their careers were three times more likely 
to have clinical depression.24 These conditions, clearly the 
result of brain injury, have manifested themselves repeatedly 
in former NFL players.25 
The result of these studies led the NFL in 2009 to 
announce the imposition of its most “stringent rules to date 
on managing concussions.”26  The following year, after several 
concussions inside of the NFL and out, public awareness 
 
original URL in the Internet Archive index). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Kevin Cook, Dying to Play, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/opinion/head-injuries-in-football.html. 
 20.  Head Injuries in Football, supra note 17. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.; See also Cook, supra note 19 (“John Mackey, the pioneering president of 
the N.F.L.’s Players’ Association, was found to have frontal temporal dementia in his 
early 60’s. Former Bears safety Dave Duerson was 50 years old when he committed 
suicide, shooting himself in the chest so that his brain could be studied. (It showed 
signs of C.T.E.) Junior Seau, a 12-time Pro Bowler for the Chargers, was 43 when he 
shot himself in the chest last spring.”). 
 26.  Head Injuries in Football, supra note 17. 
SIMKINS_ILLEGAL SUBSTITUTION.DOCX  4/23/2014  10:44 AM 
268 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 24 
heightened and the long-term side effects of concussions 
became a popular concern.27 The injuries across the sport have 
led to the claim that “football has become the site of perhaps 
the gravest health crisis in the history of sports.”28 
Many spectators, sports analysts and physicians alike 
have commented on player injuries sustained during NFL 
games. Naturally, these statements increase in seriousness as 
the injury being discussed increases in severity. Dr. James 
Kelly, of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, has noted, 
Shots to the head must be outlawed and penalized with suspension, 
and even expulsion, from the sport. The seriousness of concussion 
needs to be addressed with serious consequences for those who 
inflict them. As we see, a career can be ended by concussion. So 
should the career of habitual head injury perpetrators.29 
As Director of the Brain Injury program, Dr. Kelly is an 
expert in concussions.30 
Dr. Kelly is not alone in his harsh opinion of rule violators 
who are prone to cause injury. The NFL itself takes a similar, 
albeit diluted, stance. Today, penalties for personal fouls are 
punishable by 15 yards, with the potential addition of a fine if 
the hit is severe enough.31 Additionally, NFL Commissioner 
Roger Goodell has implemented player suspensions for 
unnecessary roughness in the NFL’s quest to limit and 
discipline potential injury-causing conduct.32 
While players’ salaries have grown to seven figures, their 
longevity has also become a larger concern for the league.33 As 
 
 27.  Id. (“In October 2010 [a] helmet-first collision caused the paralysis of a Rutgers 
University player.”). 
 28.  Lawyers refer to concussions in NFL as ‘gravest health crisis in history of 
sports’; Football There are more than 5,000 individuals suing the National Football 
League, THE TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2012, at B6. 
 29.  Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: 
The Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 17, 60 (2002). 
 30.  Id.; See also Brain Injury Rehabilitation Services, REHABILITATION INSTITUTE 
OF CHICAGO, http://www.ric.org/conditions/brain/services/ (Last visited Mar. 18, 2013) 
(The Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago’s Brain Injury Program is part of a teaching 
and a research institution with specialties in concussions as well as other traumatic 
brain injury.).  
 31.  Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the 
Professional Sports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS 
& ENT. L. 127, 159 (1996). 
 32.  Ray Fittipaldo, Players Question NFL’s Call on Stand-in Referees, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/sports/steelers/ 
players-question-nfls-call-on-stand-in-referees-654908/. 
 33.  Hanson & Dernis, supra note 31, at 159. 
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early as 1995, then Buffalo Bills coach, Marv Levy, remarked, 
“The Competition Committee [of the NFL] [is] consistently 
making a concerted effort to help protect players from 
injury.”34 According to Commissioner Goodell’s statement in 
the NFL’s 2012 Health and Safety Report, in addition to the 
longevity of players’ careers, the NFL has an explicit interest 
in ensuring that players are safe to pursue their goals off of 
the field.35  In keeping with this interest, the NFL has already 
invested $22 million in funding to research and improve 
player safety with an additional $100 million to be invested 
within the next ten years.36 Of this $100 million, $30 million 
has already been granted to the Foundation for the National 
Institute of Health—making it the largest donation in the 
history of the league.37 
Additionally, prior to the commencement of the 2013 
season, the NFL reached a tentative agreement with more 
than 4,500 retired players regarding concussion-related 
litigation.38 The agreement provides that the NFL will create 
a $756 million fund that will be accessible to retired players 
and their families.39 The fund will allocate $10 million for 
medical and safety research, and, upon a finding of individual 
necessity, the fund will provide payments for medical benefits 
and injury compensation.40 While the terms of the settlement 
remain in negotiation, the apparent goal of the NFL is clear. 
The amount of capital being invested in the safety of players 
reflects the NFL’s concerns with the rate of injury in the 
league. Perhaps the NFL’s concern is in fact genuine, 
considering that rule changes are implemented despite harsh 
reactions from both fans and players who view attempts to 
limit contact as destructive to the game.41 
 
 34.  Id. at 160. 
 35.  Roger Goodell, Foreward, NFL FALL 2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, 2 (2012).  
 36.  John York, M.D., Welcome to the Fall 2012 NFL Health & Safety Report, NFL 
FALL 2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, 3 (2012).  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  NFL, Retired Players Resolve Concussion Litigation; Court-Appointed 
Mediatory Hails “Historic” Agreement, NFL COMMUNICATIONS (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://nflcommunications.com/2013/08/29/settlement-of-concussion-litigation/. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Chris Chase, NFL Players Speak out on the NFL’s Awful, New Dangerous Hit 
Rule, YAHOO! SPORTS BLOG (Oct. 20, 2012, 10:35 AM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_corner/post/NFL-players-speak-out-on-the-
NFL-s-awful-new-da?urn=nfl-278498.  
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However, without implementation by coordinated, trained, 
and prepared referees, these rule changes are likely to be 
ineffective. The NFL’s highly regarded referee corps is the 
only force standing between the rules on paper and the rules 
in play. According to the NFL, referee applicants must have a 
minimum of ten years of officiating experience, five of which 
must be conducted on a collegiate or professional field.42  For 
all intents and purposes, it appears that the group of 2012 
replacements barely met the lowest requirements. Allegedly, 
this group consists of college officials, none of who had any 
experience in Division 1 football, one former Lingerie Football 
League (LFL) official who was released by the LFL for 
incompetence, and other referees who had only officiated 
“glorified high school games.”43 
Regardless of whether the League had successfully 
collected the most qualified group of available substitute 
referees willing to officiate, the NFL’s support of these 
replacements led to much secrecy regarding their résumés.44 
Although the NFL defended the credentials of its 
replacements, its credibility suffered as information about the 
replacements’ history surfaced.45 In August 2012, as the 
preseason opened and rumors began to spread, specifically 
regarding official Craig Ochoa and the Lingerie Football 
League, the NFL immediately denied that he had been let go 
from his previous position with the LFL.46 However, in 
 
 42.  Frequently Asked Questions: How Can I Become an NFL Official, NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/help/faq (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 43.  Sam Borden, With Referees Out, N.F.L. Stars Throw Flag on Novice Fill-Ins, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/sports/football/calls-by-
some-nfl-replacement-referees-raise-concerns.html; Houston Mitchell, NFL referees: 
Lingerie Football League says NFL is using ref it fired, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 26, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/sep/26/sports/la-sp-sn-lingerie-football-
league-20120926; Rose Eveleth, What’s the Deal With The NFL’s Replacement Referees?, 
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:44 AM), 
http://blogs.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/2012/09/whats-the-deal-with-the-nfls-
replacement-referees/. 
 44.  Former NFL Chief Referee: NFL Is Lying About the Experience of Replacement 
Refs, CBS CHICAGO (Aug. 7, 2012), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/08/07/pereira-
replacement-refs-will-only-hurt-the-nfl/. (Division 1 Referees are unlikely to participate 
as replacement referees for several reasons, including (1) they know the position is 
temporary and (2) taking the position could impede their ability to receive a full time 
NFL position in the future.). 
 45.  Mike Florio, League counters Pereira’s claim of embellished credentials, NBC 
SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Aug. 7, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com 
/2012/08/07/league-counters-pereiras-claim-of-embellished-credentials/. 
 46.  Id. 
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September 2012, LFL commissioner, Mitch Mortaza, came 
forward expressing his “shock to see guys that couldn’t 
officiate in [the LFL] were officiating in the NFL.”47 Not only 
did Mortaza confirm Ochoa had in fact been let go, but he 
alluded also to reasons, such as missed calls and poor 
judgment, that “opened up [LFL] players for potential 
injury.”48 If true, these inadequacies have obvious 
implications. However, without actual proof of employment 
and termination for any of the replacements, it becomes 
impossible to draw the line between truth and embellishment. 
In addition to concerns for basic qualification, the 
replacement referees were unprepared to officiate a 
professional football season without on-field guidance from 
veteran officials. Under normal circumstance, a new referee 
gains experience while observing and interacting with those 
who have already adjusted to the job.49 In a typical season, no 
more than one rookie referee is assigned to an officiating 
crew.50 As Jim Tunney, a retired official with 31 years of NFL 
experience, stated, “[w]hen I started, I had only a few years in 
Division 1, but I had a lot of other officials around me who 
could help me. Who are these guys going to ask?”51 
Replacement referee, Jerry Frump, admitted that the 
replacements, as a group, were not ready for the challenge 
ahead of them because they “didn’t have [the] experience.”52 
The replacements came into the season without the luxury of 
being able to rely on their more experienced co-officials. Thus, 
penalties were overlooked, ignored, or unnoticed. In addition, 
the booth review, which had been extended to accommodate 
replacement referees, was of little assistance.53 Instead of the 
 
 47.  Borden, supra note 43. (“For a number of reasons, high-level college officials 
are reluctant to moonlight in the N.F.L. as replacements. They do not want to appear 
disloyal to their college conference supervisors . . . or jeopardize their current positions 
with little chance of remaining in the pros after the labor issue is settled.”); see also 
Mitchell, supra note 43. 
 48.  Mitchell, supra note 43. 
 49.  Craig Wolf, So You Want to be an NFL Referee? As the Replacement Officials 
Showed, It’s Not Easy, NJ.COM (Sept. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2012/09/so_you_want_to_be_an_nfl_refer.html#. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Borden, supra note 43. 
 52.  Sean Gregory, I Was a Replacement Ref: Inside the NFL’s 7 Weirdest Weeks, 
TIME SPORTS BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2012/09/28/a-
replacement-ref-reflects-did-the-nfl-overlook-an-obvious-experience-gap/.  
 53.  Dan Levy, Horrible NFL Replacement Officials May Be Good for the League 
Long Term, BLEACHER REPORT (Sept. 18, 2012), 
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on-field officials controlling close plays, a booth reviewer had 
the responsibility of judging whether calls were close enough 
to warrant a second look. This additional review also allowed 
for consultation with a rule interpreter; however, the 
replacements failed to make appropriate calls despite these 
safety nets.54 
One of the few individuals supporting the replacements 
was cornerback Cortland Finnegan.55 However, admiration 
from someone known for “[aspiring] to be the dirtiest player in 
the league,” is not positive support when his intention is to 
commend the replacements for not appropriately enforcing 
the rules.56 With the reputation of replacements known to 
players such as Finnegan, there was a greater risk that the 
officials’ inexperience would be taken advantage of, leading to 
an increase in injuries.57 If the NFL was as concerned with 
player safety as its public statements warrant, an 
environment where players were more susceptible to injury 
should have been avoided. 
II. NLRA §143: HISTORY & REQUIREMENTS 
The statute 29 U.S.C. § 143 applies to employees operating 
under an employment contract or collective bargaining 
agreement that contains a no strike provision, either 
expressly or impliedly.58  Under this law, “[T]he quitting of 
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of 
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of 
employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be 
deemed a strike.”59 When § 143 is invoked, courts utilize a 
four-part test to analyze the dangers in the workplace.60  For 
 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1338578-nfl-horrible-replacement-officials-may-be-
good-for-the-league-long-term. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Michael David Smith, Cortland Finnegan likes Replacements: “They let you 
play football,” NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 19, 2012, 4:40 PM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/19/cortland-finnegan-likes-replacements-
they-let-you-play-football/.   
 56.  Id.   
 57.  Benjamin Hoffman, Criticism of N.F.L. Replacement Officials Builds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/sports/football/criticism-of-
nfl-replacement-officials-builds.html.  
 58.  TNS, Inc. (TNS I), 309 NLRB 1348, 1451 (N.L.R.B. 1992); TNS, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 59.  29 U.S.C. §143 ( 2012).  
 60.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 389. 
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a claim to be successful, workers must show, based upon a 
preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) they must have 
believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous condition 
existed in their workplace; (2) this belief must have caused 
the work stoppage; (3) the belief must be supported by 
objective, ascertainable evidence; and (4) the dangerous 
condition must have posed an immediate risk of harm.61 
Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of “abnormally 
dangerous.”62 Thus, establishing this condition is determined 
on a case-by-case basis by the National Labor Relations Board 
in the first instance.63 Under these circumstances, courts have 
relied on a working definition of “abnormal,” which conveys a 
condition that is “deviating from the normal. . . or average.”64 
Football is an inherently dangerous sport. For the 
replacement referees to constitute an abnormally dangerous 
condition, they must have created additional elements of 
danger that were not previously present on a regular basis. 
The conditions of good faith and causation may be 
assumed. NFL players have a strong interest in preserving 
their own safety. Thus, there was little motive to be dishonest 
with the NFL in expressing their intent to do so. The 
circumstances surrounding the potential 2012 strike did not 
support the belief that the players may have had ulterior 
motives. In the past, ulterior motives have been noted at 
times when an abnormally dangerous work condition surfaced 
coincidentally at the expiration of a collective bargaining 
agreement.65 In the 2012 season, the NFLPA had entered a 
collective bargaining agreement with the NFL only one-year 
prior.66 Therefore, the Player’s Association was not focusing 
on the issue of safety to disguise its underlying economic 
interest. Assuming the existence of good faith, the NFL 
Player’s Association’s strike discussion indicated no purpose 
other than the concern for safety; no valid assumption can be 
made that an alternative purpose existed.67 Thus, the proper 
analysis must consider the requirements of objective and 
 
 61.  Id. at 389 (emphasis added).  
 62.  TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  John B. Flood, Revisiting The Right To Refuse Hazardous Work Amidst The 
Anthrax Crisis of 2001, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 545, 564 (2003). 
 65.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 395. 
 66.  NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Aug. 4, 2011. 
 67.  See Fittipaldo, supra note 32. 
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ascertainable evidence, and what constitutes an immediate 
risk of harm. 
A.  Objective & Ascertainable Evidence 
No matter how honest a belief in danger may be, if it is 
unreasonable or cannot be substantiated by objective 
evidence, it will not be upheld.68 However, the issue remains 
as to what constitutes objective and ascertainable evidence. 
Evidence is objective if a reasonable person might also 
consider the condition abnormally dangerous.69 Employees in 
similar fields would likely share the same opinion as the 
employee(s) in question as to whether hazards in the work 
environment were abnormal.70 This evidence can be 
ascertained through opinion testimony of an employee as to 
the conditions that he or she has observed.71 Thus, the 
evidence presented must meet the reasonable person 
standard and must be objective in so far as it will allow the 
fact finder to identify the facts. 
B. Immediate Risk of Harm 
In establishing a claim under NLRA §143, it is not 
necessary to prove that the conditions were “in fact” 
abnormally dangerous, nor does an employee have to 
“actually manifes[t] physical injury or [be] on the verge of 
doing so as a result of [the] conditions.”72 A principal case on 
the matter, TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, states that the failure of a 
regulatory agency to shut a place of business down for health 
and safety reasons despite its authority to do so does not 
 
 68.  Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974); 
see also TNS, Inc. (TNS I), 309 NLRB 1348, 1357 (N.L.R.B. 1992) (“What controls is not 
the state of mind of the employee or employees concerned, but whether the actual 
working conditions shown to exist by competent evidence might in the circumstances 
reasonably be considered ‘abnormally dangerous.’”); See also TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392 
(“[T]his circuit has held that the important question . . . is not whether abnormal 
danger actually existed, but whether it was shown by objective evidence that 
employees’ working conditions ‘might reasonably be considered ‘abnormally 
dangerous.’”). 
 69.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Knight Morley, 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957) 
(“Laymen may testify as to physical conditions which they themselves have observed.”). 
 72.  TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1356.  
SIMKINS_ILLEGAL SUBSTITUTION.DOCX  4/23/2014  10:44 AM 
2014] Illegal Substitution 275 
mean that an abnormal danger does not exist.73 In the 
instance referred to, the abnormally dangerous condition in 
fact was not in question.74 The employees’ belief of such a 
condition was the predominant issue.75 However, while the 
condition does not have to be proven to in fact exist, there 
must be a “presently existing threat” or “immediate danger.”76 
This requirement is not satisfied merely because an already 
existing threat in the work place becomes more than the 
employee cares to handle.77 The relevant test, therefore, must 
establish, based on objective evidence, that an inherently 
dangerous condition has “changed significantly for the worse” 
and now poses “a substantial threat of imminent danger.”78 
III. APPLICABILITY OF NLRA § 143 
In the first forty years of the statute’s existence, only six 
instances of abnormally dangerous conditions were found.79 In 
these six cases, there were findings of immediate dangers that 
were “substantially greater than those presented by normally 
existing conditions” at the workplace.80 Thus, in order to 
successfully assert that NLRA § 143 is appropriate for the 
NFLPA, it would have had to do the same and establish that 
 
 73.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974). 
 77.  TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1358 (“[W]ork which is recognized and accepted by 
employees as inherently dangerous does not become ‘abnormally dangerous’ merely 
because employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thing or their forbearance 
ceases.”). 
 78.  Id. at 1357 (Noting that in its original form, this test had two parts and was 
applied to workers that were exposed to radioactive and/or toxic substances in the 
workplace. The test’s two parts for proving an abnormally dangerous condition were: 
“[E]ither (1) that inherently dangerous conditions in the subject workplace had changed 
significantly for the worse, so as to impose a substantial threat of imminent danger if 
exposure were continued at the time the employees began to withhold their services, or 
(2) that the cumulative effects of exposure to those substances had reached the point at 
which any further exposure would pose an unacceptable risk of future injury to 
employees.”). 
 79.  Richmond Tank Car Co., 264 NLRB 174 (1982); Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 224 
NLRB 542 (1976); Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278 (1975); Fruin-Colnon 
Construction Co., 139 NLRB 894 (1962), enforcement denied, 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 
1964); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 138 NLRB 737 (1962), enforced, 330 F.2d 492 
(3d Cir. 1964); Knight Morley Corp., 116 NLRB 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753 (6th 
Cir. 1957). 
 80.  TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
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playing conditions had changed. As previously stated, good 
faith and causation need not be questioned;81 the focus of the 
analysis, therefore, is on whether there is ascertainable, 
objective evidence that will support a finding of an 
abnormally dangerous condition, and whether the player 
employees were at risk of immediate harm because of this 
condition.82 
A.  Objective & Ascertainable Evidence 
To determine whether there was ascertainable and 
objective evidence, the NFLPA would have had to first look to 
the standards set forth in prior case law in order to establish 
its NLRA § 143 claim. Objective evidence is that which will 
convince a person to reasonably decide that a dangerous 
condition exists.83 Such objective evidence is found when a 
person in a similar field of employment would agree with a 
statement made regarding the safety of a working condition.84 
The case providing this standard involved a truck driver who 
stated that his vehicle was not safe to drive, and based on 
agreement from other drivers, the evidence was “objective 
enough . . . to lead a person to reasonably determine that he 
should not drive such a truck.”85 
1. Players’ Opinions Submitted as Objective Evidence 
With this as the standard for objective evidence, the 
opinions of all players would have to have been evaluated to 
determine whether they generally believed a dangerous 
condition existed and whether that condition was 
substantially different from typical on-field experience.86 
Although the opinions of players were never collectively 
compiled, their opinions of the replacements were no secret.87 
New York Giants defensive end Mathias Kiwanuka said that, 
in reviewing the calls that the replacement referees were 
 
 81.  See Fittipaldo, supra note 32. 
 82.  TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
 83.  TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278, 280 (1975)). 
 86.  Id.; TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
 87.  Ian Begley, Ex-ref: Roger Goodell Doesn’t Care, ESPN (Sept. 18, 2012, 8:19 
PM), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_/id/8396189/former-referee-jerry-markbreit-
blasts-nfl-roger-goodell-use-replacement-officials.  
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missing, “player safety is the big issue.”88 Defensive lineman 
Justin Tuck of the Giants agreed.89 He mentioned specifically 
that he witnessed pass interference “at a high rate” that had 
not been called, as well as holding.90 Tuck stated that, when 
rules are not followed because the replacements are not 
making calls, “[y]ou get guys that (are) getting pulled down 
and get hamstring (injuries); you get all these different types 
of things that could happen and player safety becomes an 
issue.”91 Kiwanuka agreed that, when “you let people get 
away with stuff, they’re going to continue to do it.”92 
Philadelphia Eagles receiver Jason Avant reiterated this 
sentiment.93 He even went so far as to say, “[g]uys are going to 
kind of cheat” when they know what the replacements are 
going to ignore.94 It is clear that, even if some players were 
not worried about their own safety, they knew that the 
replacement referees were creating an environment in which 
rules were not strictly followed and they saw this as an 
opportunity to be more aggressive.95 
In addition to comments that many players and coaches 
made regarding the replacements, others directly 
reprimanded the officials for their inadequacies. Larry Foote, 
Pittsburg Steelers linebacker, was seen chasing an official off 
the field to confront him—he believed that an uncalled illegal 
chop block had injured his teammate.96 Cortland Finnegan 
aside, it is obvious that there was a general concern for the 
ability of the replacements to officiate in a manner that would 
protect the safety of players. 
2. Replacement Referee Performance 
What then must be considered is whether these concerns 
were reasonable or justified enough to be considered objective. 
For this, we can look to what actually happened on the field 
during the reign of the replacement referees. Aside from the 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Replacement Officials Taking Heat, ESPN (Sept, 18, 2012, 6:27 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8394294/nfl-coaches-players-fed-fill-refs. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Smith, supra note 55.   
 96.  Fittipaldo, supra note 32. 
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errors in marking balls, or the inaccuracy in applying the 
correct number of yards to a penalty, what solidified the 
players’ concern for their safety were the missed calls that led 
to injury. Unfortunately for the players, as well as for the 
reputations of the replacement referees, injury did in fact 
happen.97 Fortunately, the injury was not serious enough to 
end the season or career of its victim, but it did establish the 
danger present on the field.98 During the last week under the 
replacement referees, Darrius Heyward-Bey, Oakland Raiders 
receiver, was hit with helmet-to-helmet contact, immediately 
became unconscious, and thereafter suffered a neck strain 
and concussion.99 The hit, even though it ultimately required 
Heyward-Bey to be taken from the field on a stretcher, was 
not penalized by the replacements.100 This was precisely the 
kind of injury that the NFLPA feared would be caused by the 
inadequacies of the replacement officials. The injury 
establishes the dangerous condition that existed on the field 
under the control of the replacement referees. 
A possible second basis for assessing the adequacy of 
referees is the rate at which  coaches’ challenges overturned a 
call on the field, but this would be without merit. Over the 
past five years, the rate of overturned rulings has consistently 
increased—the highest being a 53% rate of plays overturned 
by coaches’ challenges.101 In the 2012 season, for the first time 
in five years, the rate dramatically decreased. With only 31% 
of play calls being overturned through Week 2 of the regular 
season, it may seem that the replacements were making the 
appropriate calls.102 However, the reason for this decrease is 
the booth review, in more than one respect.103 The statistic 
 
 97.  Sam R. Quinn, Darrius Heyward-Bey Injury: Updates on Raiders WR’s Head 
Inury, BLEACHER REPORT (Sept. 23, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1345172-
darrius-heyward-bey-injury-updates-on-raiders-wrs. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Barry Wilner, Replacement Refs Create Chaos In NFL Week 3, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/23/replacement-refs-
chaos-nfl-week-3-49ers-challenges_n_1908131.html. 
 101.  Kevin Clark, The NFL Replacement Ref Audit, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443816804578004 
613701813182.html. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Mike Florio, Replacement Ref “Audit” Misses the Point, NBC SPORTS: 
PROFOOTBALLTALK    (Sept. 21, 2012),   http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/21/ 
replacement-ref-audit-misses-the-point/. 
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neither includes the rate at which referees’ decisions were 
overturned when the replay was initiated by the booth—
instead of the coach—nor does it consider that, in a typical 
NFL game, the referees on the field review the calls that 
coaches challenge, not the booth.104 Therefore, the booth 
reviewer in this instance is technically also a replacement—at 
least with respect to the job that he or she is performing when 
assessing coaches’ challenges.105 Additionally, the rate of 
challenge does not indicate every incorrect or missed call. 
Alternatively, the league-generated referee grades, which 
are based on a play-by-play analysis of each game, should be 
assessed.106 In Week 1 alone, before the replacements had 
made any significant mistakes and before the criticism had 
reached an apex, the average officiating errors per game 
exceeded thirty, as opposed to the single digit averages of the 
regular officials.107 
Setting statistics aside, the NFL admittedly “trained, 
championed, and cultivated” its referee corps in order to 
enhance safety, and without them, safety became a prominent 
issue.108 Players agreed that, with the NFL regarding safety 
so highly and fining players to further that interest, it was 
counterintuitive to have officials on the field who were unable 
to protect the safety of players.109 
3. Reports from Relevant Regulator Agencies 
Additionally, objective evidence in other settings has been 
found in the reports of regulatory agencies regarding safety 
violations in a work place. In the leading case on the matter, 
TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed a prior decision of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) in which the Board found that, although an 
abnormally dangerous condition may not have existed in fact, 
the employees provided objective evidence to suggest that 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Matt Brooks, NFL to teams: Replacement referees will work Week 1, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-
lead/post/nfl-to-teams-replacement-referees-will-work-week-1/2012/08/29/13f9669e-
f204-11e1-a612-3cfc842a6d89_blog.html. 
 109.  Begley, supra note 87. 
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their belief in the abnormally dangerous condition was 
reasonable.110 The TNS employees were exposed to depleted 
uranium, a radioactive and carcinogenic substance, in their 
work place.111 While the employees were exposed to this 
carcinogen daily, the rates of exposure were regulated by the 
appropriate state agency.112 The regulatory agency issued 
several citations to TNS for health and safety violations; 
however, no further action was taken.113 The employer did not 
completely alleviate the condition, nor did the employees 
immediately stop work.114 However, when the employer 
sought to use the employees’ continued work as evidence of 
their acceptance of the safety hazards, and of the absence of 
an abnormally dangerous condition, the NLRB justified the 
employees’ ultimate work stoppage.115 It found that the safety 
standard violations were enough to establish a good faith 
belief in the dangerous condition.116  While the Sixth Circuit 
in TNS did not find the evidence provided to be substantial 
enough to support this finding,117 the court did decide that the 
NLRB may find objective evidence to support an employee’s 
belief in an abnormally dangerous condition, despite the 
inaction of the relevant regulatory agencies.118 
Thus, in addition to players’ reasonable beliefs as objective 
evidence regarding the safety on the field, the NFLPA may 
also look to comments made by the NFL in order to implicate 
the NLRA § 143 exception to the no-strike provision. While a 
fine imposed on a player is not the NFL’s “comment” in a 
strict sense, the fines assessed during the use of replacement 
referees certainly send a message. The NFL, notwithstanding 
its attempts to downplay the negative attention generated by 
the replacement referees, has implicitly acknowledged the 
officials’ inadequacies by issuing fines for penalty-free play. 
Once the NFL has imposed a fine, it has also conceded that 
the activity was in fact illegal, and, generally speaking, 
should have been called on the field. 
 
 110.  TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 111.  Id. at 387. 
 112.  Id. at 397. 
 113.  Id. at 398. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398. 
 117.  Id. at 403. 
 118.  Id. at 400. 
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The League’s message was obvious after the Week 1 fines 
were issued: despite replacement officials missing penalties, 
players would be held accountable for their illegal actions. 
Everson Griffin, Minnesota Vikings defensive lineman, was 
fined $15,750 for his only Week 1 hit.119 This hit, although 
ignored by the replacement officials, inflicted helmet-to-
helmet contact to Jacksonville Jaguars quarterback, Blaine 
Gabbert.120 Griffin was not the only player to be fined after a 
game for a penalty that was not called on the field.121 Golden 
Tate of the Seattle Seahawks was fined $21,000 for an illegal 
block against Sean Lee of the Dallas Cowboys.122 Tate used 
the crown of his helmet to inflict a blindside hit on Lee, 
violating Rule 12 of the Official Playing Rules of the NFL.123 
The hit was not penalized on the field, but the NFL 
recognized it as an oversight by replacement officials.124 This 
is precisely the dangerous play that can occur without proper 
rule implementation.125 The NFL’s fines for behavior exhibited 
on the field indicates its concession that illegal activity is 
occurring, and the publicity of the flagless fines only further 
exposes the NFL’s knowledge of the replacement referees’ 
failures. 
The fines implemented for illegal activity, typically hits 
made illegal for safety reasons, are comparable to the safety 
citations in TNS, Inc.126 The NFL, the ultimate regulatory 
authority in the situation, recognized the safety issues by 
imposing fines for the behavior; however, as an employer, it 
did not do its utmost to alleviate the dangerous situation.127 
As in TNS, Inc., the fines may not be enough for the NFLPA 
 
 119.  Tim Yotter, Griffen fined $15,750 for Hit on Gabbert, SCOUT (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://scouthoops.scout.com/a.z?s=75&p=9&c=2&cid=1221595&nid=3286517&fhn=1&p
g=4&yr=2010. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Michael David Smith, NFL fines Golden Tate $21,000 for block on Sean Lee, 
NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 19, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports. 
com/2012/09/19/nfl-fines-golden-tate-21000-for-block-on-sean-lee/. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Roger Goodell, Official Playing Rules and Casebook of the National Football 
League, NFL (2012) (“Rule 12, Section 2, Article 6: Unnecessary Roughness. There shall 
be no unnecessary roughness. This shall include, but will not be limited to: . . . (h) using 
any part of a player’s helmet (including the top/crown and forehead/’hairline’ parts) or 
facemask to butt, spear, or ram an opponent violently or unnecessarily.”). 
 124.  Smith, supra note 121. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398. 
 127.  Smith, supra note 121. 
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to establish that a dangerous working condition in fact 
existed.128 However, the NFL’s failure to take more immediate 
action when signing a CBA with the NFLRA, despite the 
safety issues posed by the replacements, does not preclude the 
NFLPA from establishing its reasonable belief that an 
abnormally dangerous condition did exist.129 
4. The NFL’s Prior Dedication to Safety 
The NFL has not concealed its intention to make 
alterations to the game in order to protect the safety of 
players. DeMaurice Smith, NFLPA Executive Director, has 
noted, “The NFL has chosen to prevent the very officials that 
they have trained, championed and cultivated for decades to 
be on the field to protect players and—by their own 
admission—further our goal of enhanced safety. That is 
absurd on its face.”130 During the 2011 season, the NFL 
initiated concussion awareness training for referees, most 
notably due to San Diego Chargers lineman Kris Dielman’s 
seizure after an undiagnosed and unaddressed concussion.131 
The replacement referees did not have the opportunity to 
internalize the concussion awareness techniques developed in 
this training, like the rules in general.132 Although they were 
given “concise” concussion training, this information was in 
addition to the regular rules training.133 The overload of 
information coupled with inexperience, high intensity on the 
field, and the lack of time available to absorb the material, 
meant the replacements were not equipped to effectively 
apply the condensed version of the training they had been 
 
 128.  TNS II, 296 F.3d at 403. 
 129.  Id. at 400. 
 130.  Samano, supra note 1 (Smith notes several points in the safety of the game: 
“One, the players and the league have made tremendous strides in trying to make the 
game safer over the last three years. . .The second fact is, at the players’ urging, the 
National Football League last year gave the referees more power to spot and deal with 
a concussed or injured player. The third inescapable fact is, over the last 20 years the 
league has done everything to maintain an experienced referee corps.”). 
 131.  Mark Maske, NFL to educate game officials on recognizing players’ concussions 
after Kris Dielman incident, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-02/sports/35284056_1_concussion-kevin-
guskiewicz-spine-medical-committee. 
 132.  Sean Gregory, Will Replacement Refs Put NFL Players’ Safety at Risk, TIME 
BLOG: KEEPING SCORE (Aug. 31, 2012), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2012/08/31/ 
will-replacement-refs-put-nfl-players-safety-at-risk/. 
 133.  Id. 
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given.134 
The league has insisted on creating a safer environment 
for players, yet while it impliedly and explicitly acknowledged 
the deficiency in the replacement staff and continued to 
prolong the CBA negotiations, the safety of players was at 
risk. For players, there was a vast difference between trained, 
experienced, properly qualified referees and the less 
competent replacement staff. The replacements, through no 
fault of their own, were under-qualified for the positions they 
were given. Because of their inexperience, they put the 
players at risk by creating an abnormally dangerous condition 
on an already dangerous field. 
B.  Immediate Risk of Harm 
In order to fully understand the risk of harm that the 
players faced, both the causal chain leading to, and the 
severity of, the potential injuries must be considered. As 
stated by the concerned players, the higher risk of injury with 
the replacement referees resulted from their inefficiency in 
calling fouls.135 Because calls were being missed, players were 
more inclined to push the replacements in order to see what 
would and what would not be called. Therefore, they were 
more physical and, in some cases, disregarded or took 
advantage of rules designed to prevent injury.136 Nevertheless, 
if a player delivers a strong hit, whether said hit is penalized 
is irrelevant to the potential risk of injury. However, injuries 
were likely to stem from the players’ conception that they 
could “get away with” illegal behavior, and furthermore, that 
it was permissible to try to get away with this behavior.137 
Therefore, although the replacements themselves were not 
directly causing the injury, their lack of control of the game 
and their reputations among players were the proximate 
cause of a more physical, unnecessarily dangerous game. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Inexperienced officials will inevitably make mistakes in 
play calls before they grow accustomed to the fast pace and 
 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Begley, supra note 87. 
 136.  Id.; See also Smith, supra note 55.   
 137.  See Begley, supra note 87. 
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high energy in an NFL game. For this reason, under usual 
circumstances, the NFL places only one rookie referee in each 
game.138 The potential for mistakes in employing an entire 
officiating crew of rookies is limitless. During the reign of the 
replacement referees, calls were missed during every game, 
some more obvious than others.139 Even the NFL was 
compelled to release a statement regarding the missed 
offensive pass interference call in the Green Bay v. Seattle 
game that resulted in a Seattle touchdown and cost Green 
Bay the game.140 While the “W” was taken from the Packers, 
the NFL chose not to alter the record of either team because, 
without the pass interference call, a lack of which was not 
reviewable, the elements of the play that were reviewable 
would not overturn the touchdown.141 Even amid 
campaigning, President Obama and Vice Presidential 
Candidate Paul Ryan took to the media to comment on the 
performance of the replacement officials after this 
particularly unfortunate display.142 
The presence of the replacement officials created an 
abnormally dangerous condition that put the safety of players 
at risk of immediate harm. As stated, in order to legally stop 
work due to this condition, despite the NFLPA and NFL’s 
CBA, the NFLPA would have had to establish that (1) players 
believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous condition 
existed on the field; (2) this belief must have caused the 
strike; (3) the belief must have been supported by objective, 
ascertainable evidence; and (4) the dangerous condition must 
have posed an immediate risk of harm.143 The actions of the 
replacement referees established their under-qualification 
through their inability to perform the necessary tasks of 
officiating and enforcing the NFL rules that prevent injury 
 
 138.  Wolf, supra note 49. 
 139.  Michael David Smith, Packers fans protest at Lambeau Field, NBC SPORTS: 
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 25, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/25/ 
packers-fans-protest-at-lambeau-field/. 
 140.  NFL Statement on Final Play of Green Bay Packers-Seattle Seahawks Game, 
NFL Communications (Sept. 25, 2012), http://nflcommunications.com/2012/09/25/nfl-
statement-on-final-play-of-green-bay-packers-seattle-seahawks-game/.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Margaret Chadbourn & Samuel P. Jacobs, Obama, Ryan Agree: NFL’s 
Replacement Officials Need Replacing, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE88O1EN20120925. 
 143.  TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis 
added).  
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and protect safety. All players seem to agree—the rules were 
not being followed because infractions were not being 
acknowledged.144 This lack of enforcement created a 
dangerous field environment where players could not expect 
the protection afforded by the rules.145 Thus, an already 
dangerous game was transformed and the standard risks 
became substantially greater in all respects. However, most 
relevantly, the immediate risk of head injury expanded 
gravely. As in any other circumstance where an individual in 
a position of power is replaced, individuals will be inclined to 
see what they can get away with. In this situation, players 
were aware of the officials’ inadequacies and were able to 
push the limits with certain rules. In doing so, their 
opponents were put in a preventable position of danger. 
The NFLPA would be able to establish that the 
replacement referees constituted an abnormally dangerous 
condition within the NFL that put the players’ safety at 
immediate risk of harm. They therefore would have been able 
to successfully strike, despite the “No Strike” provision of 
their collective bargaining agreement. 
 
 
 144.  Begley, supra note 87. 
 145.  Id. 
